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I. INTRODUCTION 
In our increasingly globally linked world, comparative law needs to 
take an ever more crucial role. With the rise of important new 
developments over the last thirty years, like the proliferation of the 
computer and the internet, global capital markets that begin in Asia and 
end in the United States, and the mutual trade in commodities like oil, 
foodstuffs, and metals, we are linked in important common ways. The 
computer, and especially its generation of the internet has made us, in 
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effect, a global village. Still, of course, there are differences among areas 
of the world and countries, notwithstanding our common linkages. And so, 
that brings us to the topic at hand: assessing the role and methodology of 
comparative law so that we can come up with a sound methodological 
framework to better understand the role of law in different countries as a 
way of promoting insight and knowledge and, perhaps, some degree of 
harmonization over critical issues or, at least, a measure of common 
understanding. The gathering of knowledge obtained through comparative 
law can be a vital portal to a foreign culture. The insights gathered can 
usefully illuminate the inner workings of a foreign legal system. And these 
insights can be applied to our own legal culture, helping illuminate 
different perspectives that may yield a deeper understanding of our legal 
order. 
First, some insight into comparative law. The essence of comparative 
law is the act of comparing the law of one country to that of another. Most 
frequently, the basis for comparison is a foreign law juxtaposed against the 
measure of one’s own law. But, of course, the comparison can be broader: 
more than two laws, more than law, more than written words. 
The key act in comparison is looking at one mass of legal data in 
relationship to another and then assessing how the two lumps of legal data 
are similar and how they are different. The essence of comparison is then 
aligning similarities and differences between data points, and using this 
exercise as a measure to obtain understanding of the content and range of 
the data points. Here we need to focus quite carefully on the similarities 
and differences among the data points derived from the different legal 
systems.1 What is the substance of the data point? How does it diverge 
from the point to which it was compared? What is the nature of the 
divergences? What do the divergences and similarities reveal? On what 
data are the revelations based? 
It is not enough simply to compare words on the page. Law sits within 
a culture. Law both drives and is influenced by the culture of the home 
country. So we must look beneath the law as written formally in text. We 
need to excavate the underlying structure of law to understand better what 
the law really is and how it actually functions within a society. To do this, 
we need to explore the substructural forces that influence law. These can 
be things like religion, history, geography, morals, custom, philosophy or 
ideology, among other driving forces. Professor Bernhard Grossfeld and I 
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have referred to these forces as “invisible powers.”2 Rodolfo Sacco terms 
these underlying influences “legal formants,” influences that help drive the 
formation of law.3 The point, simply stated, is that to get a complete 
understanding of law, we need to look fully at how law operates within a 
culture. 
To do this, we need to learn to look at the law of a foreign country 
carefully. Critical here is the need to free ourselves from our own biases 
derived from our own culture, or what Vivian Curran refers to as a 
“cognitive lock-in.”4 This entails, first, immersion in the culture under 
review. Second, once the culture has been studied and the results gathered, 
we need to step outside that culture and view the data carefully and 
objectively. We should learn to apply the skills of a scientist; looking 
clear-eyed and straightforwardly at the legal data points derived from 
foreign cultures, and then carefully assessing them, understanding the 
legal concepts as written and as influenced by the substructural elements. 
To do this well, we should look to the skills of an anthropologist, learning 
the techniques necessary to understand foreign cultures in a neutral, 
unbiased way. We can thus rid ourselves of our cultural biases, whether 
from our own culture or the foreign culture under review.  
As we reassess the methodology of comparative law, we need also to 
reassess the purposes and missions served by comparative law. Generally, 
comparative law has been employed as a discipline to understand foreign 
law and culture. It is also used to understand our own culture better 
through the process of comparison to another culture. In the post-World 
War II emergence phase, especially in the United States due to the 
transplantation of European emigres from the Nazi era,5 comparative law 
has sometimes entailed a search for universal principles of law that 
transcend culture, primarily in the field of private law,6 but with elements 
 
 
 2. Bernhard Grossfeld & Edward J. Eberle, Patterns of Order in Comparative Law: 
Discovering and Decoding Invisible Powers, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 291 (2003). 
 3. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law II, 39 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 343, 385 (1991). 
 4. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. 
Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43 (1998). 
 5. Perhaps the Nazi-era emigres’ quest was based on a pursuit of natural law, principles that 
would stand over and above human nature as an extrinsic code of conduct to regulate behavior. 
Perhaps commitment to such universal principles would ward off the demons of base human nature, as 
experienced by these emigres in the time of Hitler and Stalin. 
 6. For example, we might also point to the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law’s (“UNCITRAL’s”) movement toward the harmonization of private law, including the highly 
successful Convention on International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) that bridges civil and common law 
contract principles. Unification of private law is also “a task undertaken by the Institute for the 
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transforming public law as well.7 These are all important missions of 
comparative law.  
But now, we must ask, should comparative law step outside its 
traditional missions and embark on grander pursuits? For example, should 
comparative law play a larger role in shedding light and, perhaps, helping 
solve important public policy questions—questions that often transcend 
national borders? Such important concerns could include informational 
and data privacy, consumer protection, antitrust law, or intellectual 
property, to mention just a few. Or comparative law could be used to 
illuminate issues of great importance to the human person. Traditionally, 
the focus here has been on private law, including subjects like contracts, 
property, and choice of law. But now there is a burgeoning field of 
comparative constitutional law. A deeper comparative focus on 
constitutional orders might lead us to question and reexamine core 
principles of the constitutional order, like freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, equality, or structural matters like separation of powers.  
Comparative law should also focus more intently on non-Western legal 
orders. Especially crucial for consideration are the legal cultures of Asia, 
most notably, those of China and India—two rising superpowers—and of 
Japan, which is already an important player on the world stage. Focus 
should also turn more intently on indigenous peoples, whose practices 
might yield insight into human behavior unencumbered by the 
complications of the modern world. Evaluation of older cultures in place 
before the rise of legal systems can yield important information about the 
 
 
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT).” Sompong Sucharitkul, Unification of Private Law and 
Codification of International Law, 3 UNIFORM L. REV. 693, 693 (1998). 
 7. Here we might note, for example, the creation of the United Nations and its many missions 
and treaties, such as the United Nations Convention on Human Rights or the United Nations 
Convention for the Rights of the Child. Or we might consider the International Bill of Rights that 
consists of three documents: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
 Certainly the quest for common, unifying principles has been a goal of post-World War II 
international law.  
We can find the notion of human rights in all societies and at all times, in Europe as well as in 
Asia and Africa, in antique as well as in modern Chinese philosophy, in Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The idea of human dignity is common to all 
these concepts, which emphasize different values according to the different conditions and 
diverse societies in which the human beings happen to be living. Human dignity and tolerance 
constitute the basic core of human rights. 
Sompong Sucharitkul, A Multi-dimensional Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 62 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 305, 306 (1986–1987). 
 For an evaluation of the role of foreign law in the United States, see Timothy K. Kuhner, The 
Foreign Source Doctrine: Exploring the Role of Foreign and International Law in Interpreting the 
Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1389 (2007). 
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basic elements and structure of modern societies. Looking at ourselves 
through these mirrors could reveal important ideas, norms, rules, or 
principles, forcing a reevaluation that may improve the social order or, 
alternatively, lead us to confirm the tenets of our own legal system. 
In taking on this new mission, comparative law can learn a lot from 
other disciplines that have arisen in the last thirty years to challenge 
conventional ways of thinking. Important disciplines to consider are the 
wide range of Critical Legal Studies, law and economics, law and 
sociology, and feminism, to name just a few. Like these disciplines, 
comparative law must also stand on its own as an independent, scientific 
discipline.8 With a keen focus on comparative law, we can reassess the 
underlying principles that make up the legal order and determine what, if 
anything, needs to be done, nationally, regionally, or internationally. 
To accomplish these goals, Part II will lay out the methodology of 
comparative law. My proposal for comparative methodology consists of 
these steps: Step 1 calls for acquiring the skills of a comparativist. These 
skills require immersion in the culture under review, linguistic knowledge, 
and the application of neutral, objective evaluative skills. Step 2 requires 
the application of these comparative skills to evaluate the external law, 
which consists of the law as written or stated. Here we must do a close 
assessment of the similarities and differences of the laws of different 
countries under review. Step 3 involves applying that same methodology 
to the internal law, a level of law that lies beneath external law yet has 
important influences on the formation of law. Finally, in Step 4 the results 
of comparative investigation are assembled in order to determine what we 
can learn from the foreign legal system and how that insight might reflect 
on our own legal system. Part III will then turn to describing and outlining 
the mission of comparative law. Here the focus will be on employing 
comparative law methodology to help gain insight into the laws of non-
Western countries and solve pressing public policy questions. 
II. COMPARATIVE LAW METHODOLOGY 
First, it is important to get a sense of comparative law and its 
methodology. As applied to law, the act of comparison provides insight 
into another country’s law, our own law, and, just as importantly, our own 
perceptions and intuitions—a self-reflection that can often yield insight 
 
 
 8. Comparative law must be “develop[ed] into a coherent and intellectually convincing 
discipline.” Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of 
the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 673 (2002). 
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into our view of the law. Do we see law as only rules—as commands that 
channel us along prescribed paths? Do we see law as filtered through the 
lens of our own law, native predispositions associated with our home 
territory? Is this a form of cognitive lock-in that colors or even blinds us? 
This would, of course, be quite natural, as we all reflect our own 
acculturations. Or do we see law as only illusion? Do we sense a 
disjunction between law as written versus law as applied or practiced 
within a given culture? Is there some operative code or hidden formant we 
are missing that actually drives the pattern of law? 
Perhaps we are not accustomed to asking such questions. Most of us 
are situated within our own native culture, and within that culture we work 
with the common clay of material that we have grown up with and become 
accustomed to. We know our own culture well, have learned to appreciate 
it, and may assume it to be the best. Sometimes we may be right. But we 
are likely just as often wrong. Inhabiting only our own legal system can be 
insulating and distorting, which brings us back to comparative law and its 
purpose. Comparative law offers us avenues by which to access other, 
foreign patterns of thought and organization different from those familiar 
to us. We learn a different language, a different legal culture altogether, 
something we might call different “patterns of order that shape people, 
institutions, and the society in a jurisdiction.”9 
Sensing and appreciating the difference of other legal cultures can be 
enriching. We might sense commonalities in legal systems, such as rules, 
categories, or patterns of thought or order that resonate across national 
borders and sit also in our own law. Are there common archetypes 
embedded within multiple legal systems? If so, what does this mean? Does 
this lead to a quest for universal principles of law? The pursuit of common 
principles might form a bridge between different cultures, facilitating 
mutual cooperation and understanding, and hopefully even a coming 
together of peoples. But is the quest for universality simply quixotic? 
Unfortunately, there is often a disjunction between subscribed ideals and 
behavior actually undertaken. That is the messy reality of law. Law can 
only do so much. We are still left with the baseness of the common clay of 
humanity. Does this mean that a legal system is dependent on its own 
cultural setting? Or do external influences–perhaps transplants from other 
legal systems–drive a national legal order? Or is it both—that is, does a 
legal system consists of both internal and external influences? These are 
all important questions to ask. And they bring us to the purpose of 
 
 
 9. Grossfeld & Eberle, supra note 2, at 292. 
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comparative law: looking to other, foreign legal systems for illumination 
and insight in the hope that wisdom and understanding are to be gained 
from both a foreign legal system and our own. 
Turning now to the question of methodology, comparative law must 
have a sound methodology to operate as a legal science. That is my aim in 
this part of the Article: setting out a sound methodology that can be 
applied carefully, neutrally, and vigorously so that comparative law can 
fulfill its mission as a critical legal science. Let me describe the 
methodology. There are four critical parts to comparative methodology. 
The first part (Step 1) is acquiring the skills of a comparativist in order to 
evaluate law clearly, objectively, and neutrally. The second part (Step 2) is 
the evaluation of the law as it is expressed concretely, in words, action, or 
orality; we can refer to this as the external law. Once we get an 
understanding of the law as actually stated, we can move on to the third 
part (Step 3) of the methodology: evaluating how the law actually operates 
within a culture. We might refer to this as law in action or the internal law. 
Law in action is quite important, even to Western culture, as the words in 
a text often take on a different meaning when applied. Law in action is 
even more critical for non-Western cultures, whose law may be more a 
result of tradition, custom, or orality. To evaluate the law’s actual 
operation within a culture, we need to examine the underlying 
substructural elements within the culture that drive and influence the law. 
After we have evaluated the law as stated and the law in action, we can 
assemble our data (Step 4) and conclude with comparative observations 
that can shed light on both a foreign legal culture and our own. Let us now 
turn to outlining comparative law methodology.  
A. Step 1: The Skills of a Comparativist 
Comparative law aims to understand the legal rules and patterns of 
order that drive a given society. To reach such an understanding, we need 
to develop critical reasoning skills and apply them in a scientific and 
neutral manner.10 Here we need to shed our built-in, native bias or 
“cognitive lock-in” so that we can review the data objectively. This will 
call upon us to engage in the exotic: exploring and explaining the 
 
 
 10. See, e.g., JEROME KIRK & MARC L. MILLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY IN QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH 10–19 (1986); MATTEI DOGAN & ALI KAZANCIGIL, COMPARING NATIONS: CONCEPTS, 
STRATEGIES, SUBSTANCE (1994); MATTEI DOGAN & DOMINIQUE PELASSY, HOW TO COMPARE 
NATIONS: STRATEGIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 3–37 (2d ed. 1990); Günter Frankenberg, Critical 
Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 439, 443 (1985) (suggesting 
that we need to undertake a critical self-examination). 
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substructural, underlying forces that influence and form law. For natives 
of a legal system, this is a question of acculturation. Being a product of a 
culture, we intuitively sense the hidden forces that play out below the 
external manifestation of law. But in a foreign culture, fleshing out these 
hidden forces is more difficult. Here we must call upon the tools of the 
anthropologist or archeologist: studying the underlying substrata of data 
that lie within a culture. By employing these skills, we can better 
understand a foreign culture.11 
A comparativist must therefore engage in “cultural immersion,” as 
Vivian Curran advocates. This technique “requires immersion into the 
political, historical, economic, and linguistic contexts that molded the 
legal system, and in which the legal system operates. It requires an 
explanation of various cultural mentalities . . . .”12 We must also consider 
the underlying concepts, beliefs, and reasons behind law, what we might 
call the legal mind or framework of legal philosophy that helps drive and 
structure law.13 Law really cannot be understood without understanding 
the culture on which it sits. And to understand the culture, we need to 
employ acute observation, linguistic skill, and immersion in the milieu and 
social setting. For example, can we really understand the United States 
Constitution without an appreciation of the influence of the 
Enlightenment, natural law, or Republican or English Whig theory? Why, 
after all, do we refer to it as our “higher law?”  
Once we have uncovered the cultural context of law, then we can set 
out the data we have gathered. Here we need to take two approaches to the 
 
 
 11. Reitz, supra note 1, at 631–33. As John Reitz observes, a comparativist must understand the 
forms of legal reasoning and value judgments reflected in the general pattern of legal reasoning. Id. at 
632. To do this, we need to understand the examined country’s history and “philosophical and 
religious traditions” and comparativists need “strong linguistic skills and maybe even the skills of 
anthropological field study in order to collect information about foreign legal systems at first hand.” 
Id. at 631–32. See also KIRK & MILLER, supra note 10, at 10–19; DOGAN & KAZANCIGIL, supra note 
10. 
 12. Curran, supra note 4, at 43, 51; Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing in Difference: 
Comparative Law’s Potential for Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 659, 661 
(1998) [hereinafter Curran, Dealing in Difference]. 
 13. William Ewald, The Jurisprudential Approach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to 
“Rats,” 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 701, 704–05 (1998). We need to compare law from the interior point of 
view so that we can see how lawyers think in their own legal system. William Ewald, Comparative 
Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1973–74 (1995). Pierre 
Legrand calls this the “mentalité” of lawyers. See Nicholas H.D. Foster, Company Law Theory in 
Comparative Perspective: England and France, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 573, 616 (2000) (citing Pierre 
Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 60ff (1996)); see 
also Nora V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law, 
46 AM. J. COMP. L. 647, 652 (1998) (“Like the study of other religions, comparative law will help us 
understand how another person conceives of the world and how law contributes to and reflects the 
culture of a country.”). 
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culture under study. First, we must assess the data within their cultural 
context by using the knowledge we have gathered through cultural 
immersion. After we have carefully considered the law situated in culture, 
we must step back and distance ourselves from the legal order under 
review, decanting it like a fine wine, and then turn to a careful assessment 
of the data.14 In making this assessment, we must strive for neutrality and 
a healthy skepticism so that we can view a foreign culture objectively, in 
an honest and clear way.15 Here it is important to free ourselves, as best we 
can, of cultural bias, both with respect to our own culture and the culture 
under review.16 A complete cultural immersion or objective evaluation 
may not be possible, but we must do the best we can. 
After we have completed this investigation, we must employ skills of 
translation: translating one worldview into another. This translation is not 
easy. We need to be extremely careful here. We cannot assume that an 
idea or word will translate perfectly from one culture to another. We must 
recognize the meaning of the idea or word in its own culture, explain its 
underlying cultural context, and then translate that meaning as best we can 
to another legal culture, whether our own or a different, foreign culture. 
Translation calls upon us to explain the underlying context of the culture 
in which the idea or word is found. It requires understanding the multiple 
semiotic systems and linguistic contexts that situate ideas, and then 
determining how to adjust and transfer over that particular worldview into 
that of another. If we do this well, translation can be a bridge to connect 
cultures.17 Or translation can illuminate a disjunction between legal orders. 
Illuminating either connection or disjunction among cultures can yield 
valuable insights. 
These tools will help us to learn and appreciate that law is not just the 
words on the page or the chant by the sage. Employing these skills can 
lead us to new insight and new perspectives on foreign law. By gaining a 
greater understanding of the underlying socio-philosophic context that 
both reflects and helps mold law, we can obtain a fuller understanding of 
law. This more wide-eyed view of law will also lead to new perceptions of 
traditional views of law as rules, as categories, and as legally enacted 
 
 
 14. DOGAN & PELASSY, supra note 10, at 169. We need to be careful not to misinterpret legal 
phenomena. Demleitner, supra note 13, at 647; see also Frankenberg, supra note 10, at 412 (observing 
that we need to make a conscious effort to achieve distance from our assumptions). 
 15. Reitz, supra note 1, at 622. 
 16. Demleitner, supra note 13, at 653 (observing that we need to be careful not to be trapped by 
our own stereotypes and “built-in assumptions about other systems”); see also Frankenberg, supra 
note 10, at 412–14 (observing that we need to rethink our own biases and de-center our point of view). 
 17. Curran, Dealing in Difference, supra note 12, at 657, 661. 
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measures. In fact, we can only truly understand law by examining the 
visible stated law and the substructural, underlying phenomena that form 
the invisible pattern of law. We can thereby gain a fuller appreciation of 
law; not just law, but law as it sits within culture. This more 
comprehensive use of comparative law can offer fuller access to different 
and alternative patterns of thought. 
B. Step 2: Evaluating External Law, As Written or Stated 
The essence of comparative law is comparing the law of one country 
against that of another. The act of comparison requires a careful 
consideration of the similarities and differences between multiple legal 
data points, and then using these measurements to understand the content 
and range of the legal material under observation.18 To do this, we must 
look quite carefully at the legal data points under review and assess and 
understand their content, meaning, and application. Here, our focus will be 
on external law: law as written, stated, or otherwise made concrete. Words 
as written are important, but not enough. We must also understand what 
meaning the words have within the context of the case, statute, or other 
legal norm. That is, how does the legal rule fit within the broader 
framework of the legal system?  
After we have undertaken the careful evaluation of the legal data 
points, we must proceed to the next step of comparative methodology: 
comparing and contrasting the similarities and differences between the 
legal points under review in the different legal systems. First, we can focus 
on similarities. How are the multiple data points similar? Is it by word, 
rule, meaning, application, impact, or some other underlying basis? Or is it 
because of the context of the legal norm, a functional meaning, or 
something else? We need to understand the similarities between the legal 
data points under review. The meaning of words and norms can vary with 
their setting. What provides the basis for the similarity? What is the 
meaning of the similarity? How does the similarity translate across legal 
cultures? These are just some of the questions to pose. 
In the next part of Step 2, we must apply the same technique to 
assessing differences among legal data points. How and in what way are 
the legal data points different? Is the difference based on words, on 
context, on functionality, or on something else? What is the concrete 
 
 
 18. As Günter Frankenberg observes, we need to employ a “close attention to detail.” 
Frankenberg, supra note 10, at 412. See also Reimann, supra note 8, at 686 (stating that we need to 
observe hard facts). 
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meaning of the differences? What do the differences reveal? How do the 
differences translate across legal cultures? Only a close assessment of the 
legal data points will reveal the underlying differences among legal 
systems.  
Once we have undertaken the systematic study of the similarities and 
differences between legal data points, we can move on to the next step: 
exploring the reasons behind these similarities or differences and 
evaluating their significance within their legal culture.19 We need to 
compare and contrast the points so that we can arrive at a fully considered 
and understood conception of the object under study. We need, then, to 
record the data points we have considered, outlining their substantive 
content and then pointing out how they compare and contrast. Once we 
have recorded the results of our investigation, we can start to pose 
questions.  
For example, why are the legal rules or data points similar or different? 
What does that reflect–a rule, law, application, or context? How do these 
factors apply? What are the reasons for the substance of the data point? 
What does the information tell us about the legal culture? Can we learn 
something from this? Have we looked only at the law in the books? Is 
there a difference between the law in the books and the law in action? 
How do we study the law in action? And by that study can we help fill in 
the gaps between law in the books and law in action so that we get a fuller 
study of the law as it actually operates within its legal culture? These are 
just some of the questions that need to be addressed; I am sure there are 
others. When systematically applied, Step 2 can uncover the concrete 
meaning of the legal data point under review. We can then turn to the next 
step of comparative law methodology.  
C. Step 3: Evaluating Internal Law 
Turning to the third part of comparative law methodology, we must 
understand that not all law is external, overt, or otherwise readily 
identifiable on the surface. A comparativist is like an archaeologist—
mining the mass of data from a foreign source in search of uncovering 
patterns of thought and order that undergird and form a legal culture. The 
work of the comparativist is, by definition, exotic. After all, it involves 
studying a legal culture to see by what rules it is run, how these rules 
function, how effective they are, and how they influence and form the 
 
 
 19. John Reitz makes a similar point in his outstanding article on How to Do Comparative Law. 
See Reitz, supra note 1, at 626–27. 
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culture. We thereby learn much about rules, and just as importantly, we 
learn about culture. Why are the rules formed this way? Do the rules 
reflect cultural predispositions? Do the rules influence the culture? What 
does the culture consist of? How do the elements of the culture influence 
the law? 
To get to the bottom of these questions, we must understand what law 
is. Many of us think of law as rules, and this is surely part of law. We can 
look to constitutions, statutes, codes, regulations, cases, or other sources to 
find concrete statements of rules. We might think of this part of law as law 
in its external manifestation. External law is the readily identifiable form 
of law. In the Western tradition, most of external law is written; the power 
of the written word has a sola scripta character—written words convey 
authority and respect, or so they have come to function within the Western 
cultural tradition. And Westerners are accustomed to thinking of law as 
written since the words on the page convey most of the meaning one 
seeks. We need only read words and then translate their meaning. That is, 
again, the object of our evaluation in Step 2. 
But not all external law is written, stated, or otherwise made concrete. 
A second, deeper part of law lies beneath the surface and is less visible. 
These are the underlying forces that operate within a society to help form 
and influence law and give it substance. We might call this the “invisible” 
dimension of law. Not that this dimension is wholly unknown or 
unrecognizable, but more that this dimension of law is one we tend to 
assume, take for granted or only dimly perceive.20 Or we might think of 
these invisible patterns as underlying crytotypes (“the pattern to be 
revealed”), legal formants (“non-verbalized rule[s]”), or “implicit 
patterns.”21 Alternatively, we might think of this dimension as 
“substructural, often unarticulated, categorizations.”22 We might refer to 
this dimension of law as internal—forces that operate beneath the surface 
of external law, but infuse the law with meaningful content. Examples of 
internal forces might be custom, history, religion,23 ethics, geography,24 
 
 
 20. Grossfeld & Eberle, supra note 2, at 294. 
 21. Sacco, supra note 3, at 385. 
 22. Curran, supra note 4, at 45. 
 23. See, e.g., Joachim J. Savelsberg, Religion, Historical Contingencies, and Institutional 
Conditions of Criminal Punishment: The German Case and Beyond, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 373 
(2004). 
 24. For example, England is an island country, now long merged into the United Kingdom. Due 
to English isolation, English law formed much of its core on its own, reflecting its traditions. By 
contrast, France is part of continental Europe. Thus, France looked more frequently to its fellow 
Europeans for borrowings. For example, “the société à responsabilité limitée . . . was imported almost 
wholesale from Germany, partly in response to the wishes of the business community to have an 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss3/2
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language, philosophy,25 interpretation, or translation. There is a deeper 
dimension to law than that which manifests itself overtly. We must pay 
close attention to law in all of its manifestations. 
We all have a tendency to seize upon the readily identifiable aspects of 
the law and ascribe meaning to them. That approach is, however, a 
mistake. The internal dimension of law can exert powerful meaning on 
legal culture. We need to look at law fully and consider all of its aspects so 
that we can reach a better understanding of how law actually functions 
within a society. Law, of course, is like a language; in reality, it is a legal 
language. But as with a foreign language, in order to understand it truly, 
we must understand the cultural context on which it sits and which helped 
form it. Only then can we translate accurately true meaning from one legal 
system to another.26 
 
 
equivalent to the English private company.” Foster, supra note 13, at 613–14; see also Ewald, supra 
note 13, at 702 (“[T]he relevant ‘context’ [might include] the economics of the society, or its political 
structure, or social arrangements, or even (as in Montesquieu) its geography and climate.”). 
 25. French legal thought, for example, often reflects the Cartesian method of breaking an 
argument into two segments. Foster, supra note 13, at 604. There is a “greater place of theory and 
categorization in French legal thinking and the construction of a typical Cartesian, dualist [framework] 
. . . as opposed to the lack of importance accorded to theory in English law . . . .” Id. at 616. Of course, 
this would make sense, as René Descartes is French. English common law, in contrast, is based on 
practical solutions given the exigencies of the case. 
 Similarly, law and economics has had a major influence on contract and antitrust law in the 
United States. Given some of the strong similarities between the laws of the United Kingdom and 
United States, law and economics may influence English law as well. Id. at 619. However, law and 
economics has not had much of an impact on continental European countries, reflecting deep 
underlying structural differences in culture. See, e.g., Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The 
Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 
31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295 (2008). 
 26. Translation of legal concepts from one country to another can be difficult. For example, 
consider the observations made by Nicholas H.D. Foster. Foster, supra note 13. Specifically, consider 
his observations on the various terms for corporations. Older English used the term “corporation,” 
which is the common usage in North America. But more modern terminology uses the term 
“company” as the general term for business organizations. In France, the usage is “société,” although 
in old French law, the term was “compagnie.” Id. at 578. Likewise, the English term “contract” “is far 
from co-terminous with French ‘contrat.’” Id. at 596. As Professor Foster observes, it is hard to find an 
exact equivalence between legal ideas. Id. at 578. For example, comparing corporate governance in 
England and the United States—two countries with many shared traditions—reveals significant 
differences, “principally residing in the lack of a United Kingdom counterpart to the United States 
tension between notions of centralizing, bureaucratic control, and democratic freedom.” Id. at 617. As 
Reitz observes: 
Here the comparatist comes face to face with the enigma of translation. In one sense every 
term can be translated because there are things in each legal system that are roughly the 
functional equivalent of things in the other legal system. In another sense nothing can be 
translated because the equivalents are different in ways that matter at least for some purposes. 
At a minimum, generally equivalent terms in each language often have different fields of 
associated meaning, like, for example, “fairness” and “loyauté.”  
Reitz, supra note 1, at 620–21. See also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
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The cultural context of law can be quite complex. Law sits on the 
surface of culture, is vested with meaning by the culture, and, in turn, vests 
the culture with meaning. Accordingly, we must look at it in a more 
complete way as (1) external law, (2) internal law, and (3) the culture on 
which law sits. We are not studying just law, but legal culture as well. The 
study of law is as important as the study of culture. Only in this way can 
we obtain a more complete view of law, allowing us to gain truer 
understanding. 
D. Step 4: Determining Comparative Observations 
The final step in comparative law methodology is assembling the 
results of our investigation. Here we must focus on the legal data points 
under review. What is the significance of the data? What have we learned? 
Has our investigation of a foreign legal system shed light into its operation 
and meaning? Can we now understand it better? What has the foreign 
system taught us? These are probably some of the most important 
questions to ask. 
The results of comparative observation are likely to be our window into 
the world of the foreign culture. But, importantly, a look at a foreign 
culture is just as likely to shed light on our own legal culture. In effect, we 
are holding ourselves up to a mirror. How do the rules of our culture 
operate? How do our rules compare to those of a foreign system? Is there 
something in the foreign culture that can benefit or lead to improvement of 
our own system?27 Or, upon reassessment, do we conclude that our system 
operates effectively? 
These will not be easy questions to answer. Much will depend on the 
similarities and differences in the legal systems under review. For 
example, let us draw upon constitutional law. We will use structural 
governmental issues like separation of powers as a starting point. In the 
United States, separation of powers at the federal level consists of dividing 
government into three separate but equal branches of government 
(legislative, executive, and judicial). In European countries, separation of 
powers is quite different. As in the United States, power is divided 
between legislative, executive, and judicial branches. However, the 
 
 
COMPARATIVE LAW (1993); Reimann, supra note 8, at 678 (stating that legal transplants assume new 
meaning in a different culture). 
 27. MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON & CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE, 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 9 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that comparative law can lead to 
“promoting an improved understanding of one’s own legal system or searching for principles common 
to a number of legal systems”). 
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common European form consists of parliamentary democracy, with the 
Prime Minister or Chancellor serving as both a member of Parliament and 
the leader of the government. That is, the Prime Minister is part of both 
the legislative and executive branches. This would be the case, for 
example, in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. In the United 
Kingdom, in accord with English tradition, the King or Queen is the titular 
head of all three branches of government—legislative, executive, and 
judicial. Further, the judiciary is not always truly independent in the sense 
of being able to rule whether acts of governmental bodies are 
constitutional. This would be the case in the United Kingdom and France, 
although the French Conseil Constitutionel has, since 1971, been moving 
toward a role of independent judicial review.28 And, finally, most 
European countries are subject to the supranational law of the European 
Union and the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, in 
comparison to the United States, most European countries are subject to 
two legal orders, national and supranational. Thus, the European form is 
not an easy fit with that of the United States. There are significant 
differences that need to be examined and considered carefully and then 
explained to see, for instance, whether understanding or transplanting a 
rule will actually work.29 This is not to say that important insights could 
not be gained through comparison. But the translation of law from 
somewhat different legal structures can be a challenge, requiring thorough 
investigation and explanation.  
Contrast this example now with issues of fundamental rights. Take 
freedom of speech, for example. In the United States, free speech is 
textually protected without limitation, leading to a more absolutist 
approach.30 Yet, of course, the Supreme Court does limit free speech if, 
under standard methodology, a clear and present danger—or, now, 
imminent harm—is present.31 By contrast, in most European countries, 
freedom of speech is protected, but with explicit textual limitations.32 
 
 
 28. JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON & SIMON WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 147–56 
(1998). 
 29. Sometimes a transplant does not work. One example is the attempt by Italy to transplant the 
United States adversary model in matters of criminal justice, as documented by Elisabetta Grande. 
Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 
(2000). 
 30. The First Amendment Free Speech provision provides: “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 31. For example, advocacy of violence can be regulated, under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 447 (1969), “where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action.” 
 32. For example, the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
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Germany’s constitution lists express limitations on freedom of 
expression,33 as does Canada’s,34 which tends more to follow the European 
approach.  
Let us focus on obscenity as a form of expression. Interestingly, the 
constitutional provisions explicitly addressing obscenity as a form of 
expression do not mean that obscenity is uniformly treated as protected 
speech in the United States, Germany, and Canada. In the United States, 
obscenity is unprotected speech under the definition set forth in Miller v. 
California.35 By contrast, obscenity is generally protected speech in 
 
 
Fundamental Freedoms, of which most European countries are members, guarantees freedom of 
expression as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.  
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 
Europ. T.S. No. 5. 
 33. The full text of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, article 5, provides as 
follows: 
 (1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in 
speech, writing, and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally 
accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts 
and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. 
 (2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for 
the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour. 
 (3) Art and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall 
not release any person from allegiance to the constitution.  
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law] May 23, 1949, as amended, art. 
5(3), translation available at http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/Fremdsprachiges_material/ 
downloads/ggEn_download.pdf. 
 34. Under the Canadian Charter of Rights, freedom of expression is guaranteed as follows: 
 1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set 
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
 2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
. . . 
 (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press 
and other media of communication . . . .  
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
 35. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (revising Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) 
and A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 
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Germany in so far as it does not violate the core norm of dignity or 
threaten youth.36 Likewise, obscenity is mainly protected in Canada unless 
it demeans women or portrays violence.37 Comparatively, we can learn a 
lot from this example. Despite textually different treatment of freedom of 
expression—no textual limitation in the United States in contrast to textual 
limitations in Germany and Canada—obscenity is unprotected speech in 
the United States, whereas it is largely protected speech in Germany and 
Canada. Why is this the case? 
In the United States, is it because something lies beneath the written 
law that helps drive its formation? Is it morality, religion or a sense of 
ethics? We would need a deep investigation of these underlying cultural 
aspects to reach a solid conclusion. Summarily stated, religion and its 
influence on moral standards are the most plausible explanations for the 
regulation of obscenity in the United States.38  
 
 
413 (1966) (plurality opinion), which had put a gloss on the definition of proscribable obscenity). 
Under Miller, obscenity must meet these standards to be considered unprotected speech: 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts 
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.  
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). 
 36. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Consitutional Court] Nov. 27, 1990, 
83 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 130 (F.R.G.). 
 37. See, e.g., R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 484 (Can.) (declaring that unprotected obscene 
speech is “(1) explicit sex with violence, [or] (2) explicit sex without violence but which subjects 
people to treatment that is degrading or dehumanizing,” but that “explicit sex without violence that is 
neither degrading nor dehumanizing” is protected speech). Id. 
The portrayal of sex coupled with violence will almost always constitute the undue 
exploitation of sex. Explicit sex which is degrading or dehumanizing may be undue if the risk 
of harm is substantial. Explicit sex that is not violent and neither degrading nor dehumanizing 
is generally tolerated in our society and will not qualify as the undue exploitation of sex 
unless it employs children in its production. 
Id. at 454. For an overview of Canadian obscenity law, see Grant Huscroft, The Constitutional and 
Cultural Underpinnings of Freedom of Expression: Lessons from the United States and Canada, 25 U. 
QUEENSLAND L.J. 181 (2006); Kathleen Mahoney, Obscenity and Public Policy: Conflicting Values—
Conflicting Statutes, 50 SASK. L. REV. 75 (1985–1986); Kathleen E. Mahoney, The Canadian 
Constitutional Approach to Freedom of Expression in Hate Propaganda and Pornography, 55 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1992). 
 38. Christianity is most likely the driving influence in the regulation of obscenity in Western 
cultures. In the pre-Christian era, Greece and Rome tolerated rampant obscenity, which was 
considered a natural aspect of culture in that era. The Roman-led movement toward Christianity 
instigated the regulation of obscenity. According to Christian values, sex should occur only as a means 
of reproduction. Otherwise, sex is considered sinful. See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community 
Standards, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 299, 304–06 (2008); Kevin W. Saunders, The United States and 
Canadian Responses to the Feminist Attack on Pornography: A Perspective from the History of 
Obscenity, 9 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 18–19, 21–22, 25 (1998–1999). 
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In Germany, the constitutionally protected status of obscenity would 
seem to reflect the supreme valuation of a human being qua human being. 
That is, people should be free to express themselves as a constituent 
element of their personality, itself a reflection of human dignity, the core 
animating value of the Basic Law. Limitations can, most likely, only 
curtail obscenity if it violates the core underlying philosophic ideal of the 
German constitutional order, human dignity, or the textual limitation of 
article 5(2) of “the protection of young people.”39 For example, human 
dignity could be violated if the expression depicts violence or demeans a 
human being. Treating a person as an object and not a human violates 
human dignity. Otherwise, access to obscenity is left to the choice of 
people on the idea that sex is a natural part of human life and, therefore, an 
integral aspect of human autonomy and personality.40 
Canada seems to follow the European model. Freedom of expression 
there is a core element of the underlying dignity of human beings. 
Limitations on obscenity are allowed when the expression depicts violence 
or demeans people, no matter what gender, on the grounds that people are 
to be treated as of equal worth. Canada has also moved away from the 
community standards norm that is present in the United States,41 and, like 
Germany, has jettisoned morality as a basis for regulation.42 Instead, it has 
moved to a standard based on harm, mainly relating to the demeaning of 
women.43 
 
 
 At the founding of the United States, obscenity was treated as the religious offense of blasphemy. 
Boyce, supra, at 312. Victorian prudery was a major influence in the United States and Canada. Id. at 
302. After the Civil War, starting in the 1870s, Andrew Comstock led the movement for passage of 
federal obscenity legislation that suppressed sex speech. Id. at 313. While some of the religious fervor 
leading to regulation of obscenity has waned, still one of the essences of obscenity regulation is the 
“appeal[] to the prurient interest,” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), that is, the triggering of 
a sexual response. The sex act is still at the core of obscenity regulation. 
 39. Grundgesetz für die Brundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] art.5, 
translation available at http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/Fremdsprachiges_material/down 
loads/ggEn_download.pdf. 
 40. Mathias Reimann, Prurient Interest and Human Dignity: Pornography Regulation in West 
Germany and the United States, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 201, 216, 221, 229, 243 (1987–1988). Since 
the 1974 law liberalizing obscenity, graphic sex material has become widely available unless it depicts 
extreme violence or endangers youth. Id. at 212. The law prohibits “extreme hard-core pornography 
[which encompasses] sex-related violence, sexual acts by or on children, and sexual acts of humans 
with animals.” Id. at 216. “[N]otions of sexual morality or decency [are not] a sufficient ground for 
regulation.” Id. at 217. 
 41. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Under Canadian law, the community standard was applied on a 
national level, as was done in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), in contrast to the local 
community standard norm set forth in Miller. Butler, 1 S.C.R. at 479–80, 492, rejected the community 
standard. Boyce, supra note 38, at 301, 335–36. 
 42. Boyce, supra note 38, at 331. 
 43. Id. at 335–36, 338. Under Butler, harm is mainly viewed as the degradation of women. Id. at 
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In sum, we seem to see different underlying bases for the treatment of 
obscenity. In the United States it is most likely morals and religion, in 
Germany it is most likely the underlying philosophic ideal of human 
dignity, and in Canada it is most likely a concern for dignity and 
equality44—a constitutional norm that competes with freedom of 
expression. Thus, among these three Western countries, the United States 
stands apart from the more closely aligned Canada and Germany. 
Interestingly, Canada and the United States are linked closely by 
geography and strong elements of culture. Yet, constitutionally, they differ 
in important respects, including obscenity. By contrast, Germany shares 
more common geographic and legal ties to other members of the European 
Union, similarities which extend to the treatment of obscenity. 
The example of artistic expression seems to be a more pertinent fit. In 
the United States, there is, again, no textual limitation of free speech, 
including artistic expression, which is considered core speech.45 In 
Germany, by contrast, artistic expression is textually set out in absolute, 
unlimited terms.46 Thus, both countries treat artistic expression as core 
speech. The main difference, again, is that art is not mentioned in the 
United States Constitution, whereas it is signaled out in the German Basic 
Law. Thus, here the object of study—art speech—is accorded a quite 
similarly high level of constitutional protection in both countries. 
Now, a word about what we might learn from this investigation. 
Germany lays out a clear definition of what comprises artistic 
 
 
338. According to R. v. Labaye, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728, 753–54 (Can.), the harm must be “objectively” 
shown “beyond a reasonable doubt” and be so great as to be “incompatible with the proper functioning 
of society.” Specifically, “[t]he causal link between images of sexuality and anti-social behaviour 
cannot be assumed,” rather “[it] must be proved.” Id. at 751–52. No study has yet shown that 
correlation. Boyce, supra note 38, at 363. 
 44. As stated by the Court in Butler, 
The clear and unquestionable danger of this type of material is that it reinforces some 
unhealthy tendencies in Canadian society. The effect of this type of material is to reinforce 
male-female stereotypes to the detriment of both sexes. It attempts to make degradation, 
humiliation, victimization, and violence in human relationships appear normal and 
acceptable. A society which holds that egalitarianism, non-violence, consensualism, and 
mutuality are basic to any human interaction, whether sexual or other, is clearly justified in 
controlling and prohibiting any medium of depiction, description or advocacy which violates 
these principles.  
Butler, 1 S.C.R. at 493–94 (citations omitted); see also Boyce, supra note 38, at 331. 
 45. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (“[O]ur cases have never 
suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters . . . 
is not entitled to full First Amendment protection.”). 
 46. “Art and scholarship, research, and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not 
release any person from allegiance to the constitution.” Grundgesetz für die Bundsrepublik 
Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law] May 23, 1949, as amended, art. 5(3), translation available at 
http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/Fremdsprachiges_material/downloads/ggEn_download.pdf. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
470 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:451 
 
 
 
 
expression,47 and a significant body of German case law has developed 
elucidating the concept.48 By contrast, the United States Supreme Court 
has not, as yet, come up with a clear definition of art speech. Nor is there a 
sophisticated body of case law on artistic expression in the United States. 
So could the United States learn much on this subject from Germany? 
What is art speech? What are the reasons as to why it should be treated as 
core speech? Does the difference between judging art speech under the 
United States’ content-based rules, resulting in application of strict 
scrutiny, content-neutral rules, and then intermediate or rational basis 
scrutiny, lead to limitation of art speech?49 What does this reveal? Is the 
basis for the stronger regulation once again morality or some unspoken 
intuition? If so, does this reveal different underlying values? Is the United 
States more concerned with a set of ethical norms to guide behavior in 
contrast to the German focus on the development of human personality? 
III. THE MISSION OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
We can now turn to the last part of our assessment of comparative law: 
its mission. In this respect, comparative law provides a different 
perspective on law, as do the range of disciplines that have arisen in the 
last thirty years. Law and economics, for example, teaches us to appreciate 
and evaluate the economic and practical efficiency of law and its rules. 
 
 
 47. The essential characteristic of artistic activity is 
the artist’s free and creative shaping of impressions, experiences and events for direct display 
through a medium of a specific language of shapes. All artistic activity is a mix of conscious 
and unconscious events that is not rationally orderable. Intuition, phantasy and artistic 
understanding all effect artistic creation, this act of creation is primarily not informational but 
rather an immediately direct expression of the individual personality of the artist. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 24, 1971, 30 Entscheidungen 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 173 (188–89) (F.R.G.). The German Constitutional Court 
was construing the express protection of art as expression under article 5(3), which provides that 
“[a]rts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free.” The Court determined that Klaus Mann’s 
novel, Mephisto, defamed its implicit subject, a German actor (and former brother-in-law of Mann) 
who achieved fame by hitching his star to the Nazi government, an act that Mann analogized to 
Mephisto making a bargain with the devil.  
 The Court’s holding would seem to contradict the fundamental tenets of artistic expression. 
However, the Court relied on a person’s right to protection of honor, rooted in personality rights, 
including reputation, to support its ruling. Personality rights can sometimes trump expressive rights.  
 48. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 17, 1984, 
67 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfussungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 213 (F.R.G.) (expanding the definition 
of artistic expression). 
 49. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (holding that the NEA 
can set conditions for federal art grants, denying public funding for homoerotic photographs by Robert 
Mapplethorpe or provocative sexually explicit performance art by Karen Finley on the basis that these 
forms of art are indecent). 
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Critical Legal Studies and its vast genre teach us to learn and appreciate 
the power relationships (economic, racial, gender-based, immigrant, or 
other) embedded in a law or its rules. Law and literature teaches us the 
power and complexity of language in shaping legal data. Words, their 
syntax, grammar, style, and the like convey the particular context in which 
words sit and form meaning. As Rodolfo Sacco observes, “Our visible, 
superficial language is the result of identifiable transformations of latent 
linguistic patterns that are more permanent than the visible ones.”50 
Indeed, we should be careful to heed such lessons of post-modernism and 
post-colonialism; by applying the rubrics of legal science as situated 
within our own cultural setting, are we missing, glossing over, or 
distorting the wonderfully unique aspects and structures of individual 
societies, especially societies and cultures outside dominant worldviews? 
Is comparative law itself—as a Western-oriented field—an imposition of 
power on undeveloped or developing countries or their indigenous 
populations?51  
Employing the insights of other fields, such as anthropology, 
philosophy, linguistics, sociology, and history, has much to offer us in 
understanding law. In particular, we benefit from the skill of decoding the 
effect of forces entrenched within law, helping to uncover the framework 
on which law sits. Decoding is an essential part of the work of 
comparative law: discovering and translating the invisible powers in a 
legal culture leads to uncovering the patterns of order that actually operate 
within a society and yield content. We must, of course, be careful to see 
and understand the elements that actually exist and operate within a given 
society, as ordered by that society, and not, as we more naturally tend to, 
view them through our own cultural perspectives. We must learn to be 
foreign sojourners, shedding our natural predispositions, and adopting an 
eyes-wide-open perspective—the ways of the archeologist or 
anthropologist, not just the ways of a legal scholar.52 
These insights lead us back to comparative law. Comparative law is a 
quest for the exotic, the different, the other. It examines the dimensions 
and forms of law and culture outside the normal ken of one’s visage in the 
hope that one can gain new and different perspectives on law, culture, and 
patterns of order. Equally important, comparative law ultimately focuses 
back on local culture: it asks, by comparison, is our culture better or 
worse; in what way; and if so, what is to be done? The real aim of 
 
 
 50. Sacco, supra note 3, at 385. 
 51. Email from Jayanth Krishnan to author, Sept. 30, 2006 (on file with author). 
 52. KIRK & MILLER, supra note 10, at 32–46. 
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comparative law is to offer insight and perspective so that we are better 
equipped to reflect critically about ourselves and our own legal culture. 
Comparison can help us assess where we came from, where we are, and 
where we go from here. By making this kind of comparison, we obtain 
some perspective about whether we are what we want to be, or how we 
can find a way to be all that we would like to be. 
To accomplish these goals of comparative law, I advocate the open-
eyed approach to viewing law discussed above. First, and most 
fundamental, is the language. A language is the expression of a 
worldview. Only by understanding language can we realize the substance 
of the legal data. To translate language, we must understand and give 
meaning to the words, ideas, and concepts of one language, and transmute 
them to another. Some of this may easily be done by translating words 
from one semiotic system to another. But much of this is harder than 
literal translation. To understand words we must understand and decode 
the unspoken contexts, assumptions, and archetypes of a culture. This is 
the harder work of translation: rendering the socio-cognitive context so 
that the particular cultural prism of one culture can truly be conveyed to 
another. Here we must also learn to appreciate the range and effect of the 
forces that operate on law and help form legal culture.53 Through 
language, as an example, we can observe the open-eyed approach in 
action. The first level of law is its external manifestation in words: codes, 
statutes, cases rules, orality, and the like. But the words are simply the 
external manifestation and expression of ideas that sit within a culture.  
Second, we must also look beneath the words to the underlying 
subsurface of forces that vest words and legal culture with meaning. We 
have observed this exercise with respect to translation: identifying and 
conveying the socio-cognitive context of words. But the exercise of 
excavating the substructure of legal culture goes much deeper than that, as 
we have observed. We must examine the full range of forces that lie 
beneath the external law and vest it with meaning. This involves an 
examination of forces like religion, history, sociology, economics, and the 
like. Only then can we convey the fuller picture of a worldview of law. 
We must also reconsider the mission of comparative law. Generally, 
comparative law, as we have come to know it in the Western world, has 
 
 
 53. For a discussion of comparative law as translation, see, e.g., BERNHARD GROßFELD, 
KERNFRAGEN DER RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG [CORE QUESTIONS OF LEGAL COMPARISON], translated in 
COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 31 (Vivian Grosswald Curran ed. & trans., 2002); Vivian 
Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, in COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 38 (Vivian 
Grosswald Curran ed., 2002). 
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focused primarily on Western culture, usually the legal systems of North 
America and Europe and their migration to other countries, often former 
colonies. The main focus here started with private law, but now, in the last 
fifteen years or so, it has also focused a lot on public law, mainly 
constitutional and international public law.54 This mission should continue. 
But we also need to open our vistas. At least two other missions merit 
significant attention. 
First, we should take bigger steps outside Western culture and focus on 
the legal systems or patterns of legal thought present in non-Western 
countries or peoples. For example, older societies relied on orality, ritual, 
or tradition to convey meaning, respect, rules, and regulation. This was the 
custom among many native peoples in the Americas before their status 
was relegated to that of “domestic dependent nations.”55 Many indigenous 
peoples still focus on oral customs, and hopefully 
the evolution of national legal awareness of the need for a 
contemporary society to provide reliable political, economic, 
cultural and social security safety nets for its indigenous people has 
contributed in no small measures to the growing international 
consciousness of the imperative necessity to protect the precious 
cultures, traditions, ways of life and civilizations of every 
indigenous people in the world.56 
Their “cultures, traditions, ways of life and civilizations . . . must be 
preserved intact as distinct but unique social, cultural, political and 
economic grouping within the same national community.”57 
 [T]he study of comparative law is vital to the basic understanding 
of international legal developments. . . . [T]he use of comparative 
 
 
 54. See, e.g., MARK KENDE, HUNTER RODNEY CLARK, LORRAINE WEINRIB, VIKRAM 
RHAGAWAM, DONALD DOMMERS & EDWARD J. EBERLE, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (forthcoming); NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDRAS SAJO & 
SUSANNE BAER, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003); VICKI C. 
JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2006); Edward J. Eberle, 
Comparative Public Law: A Time That Has Arrived, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR BERNHARD GROßFELD 
(1999).  
 55. Sompong Sucharitkul, The Inter-temporal Character of International and Comparative Law 
Regarding the Rights of the Indigenous Populations of the World, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. Supp 3, 15 
(2002) (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)); see also Robert D. Cooter & 
Wolfgang Fikentscher, American Indian Codes: Pragmatic Law and Tribal Identity, 56 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 29 (2008) (explaining that American Indian tribes mainly set down law in codes transmitted by 
orality and tradition; these codes were not written down until the 1960s.). 
 56. Sucharitkul, supra note 55, at 3–4. 
 57. Id. at 3. 
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law techniques can serve to promote, reinforce and accelerate the 
process of crystallization of emerging norms of international law 
designed to preserve and protect the political, economic, social and 
cultural values of indigenous peoples populating the earth.58  
Nonwritten methods can be effective in forming and regulating legal 
culture. While such techniques might be used in Western countries, they 
are more prevalent in non-Western countries. For example, despite the 
pell-mell passage of a plethora of written statutes designed to embrace the 
global marketplace, Chinese norms are still most likely regulated by the 
customs and teachings of Confucius or other traditional authority. We 
might say the same of Japan: order and harmony are prime ingredients of 
Japanese culture, a legacy also of Confucianism, and this focus holds an 
important influence over legal relations.59 Confucian norms are also a 
major influence in Korea,60 although their influence here should come as 
no surprise, given Korea’s geographic proximity to Japan and China. In 
contrast, consider modern India, another emerging global economic 
powerhouse. India is certainly pursuing a course of modern economic 
development, along the lines of China. However, sociologically, classic 
Hindu law yet provides the underlying structure of social ordering. Debate 
continues over the extent to which classic Hindu law helps perpetuate the 
socio-legal-based caste system that pervasively channels social behavior.61 
As with China, progress is proceeding along Western-oriented economic 
planes, but not in other respects, as measured from a Western criterion 
(itself a potentially distorting lens). 
If we are concerned about evaluating global country power 
relationships and their impact on legal systems, then we need a deeper 
focus on the emerging major players, such as China and India, or Japan—
already a major world player. The emergence of the United States in the 
post-World War II era led to the emergence of English as the lingua 
franca of the world and the export of important American legal ideas and 
institutions. Global dominance and power often leads to global influence, 
as with the Roman Empire’s export of Roman law and England’s 
 
 
 58. Id. at 3–5. 
 59. Danian Zhang & Kenji Kuroda, Beware of Japanese Negotiation Style: How to Negotiate 
with Japanese Companies, 10 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 195 (1989). 
 60. Ilhyung Lee, Korean Perception(s) of Equality and Equal Protection, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 61. Emails from Professor Jayanth Krishnan to author (Aug. 13, 2008 & Sept. 30, 2006); see also 
Donald R. Davis Jr., Traditional Hindu Law in the Guise of ‘Postmodernism’: A Review Article, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 735 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss3/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] THE METHOD AND ROLE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 475 
 
 
 
 
Commonwealth colonization that introduced the common law to major 
areas of the world, including North America and India. Now, we might 
ask, could China or India exert the same global influence? How would this 
change the world? 
A number of scholars have taken the path of opening up windows to 
non-Western legal orders. Jayanth Krishnan has focused on India, 
evaluating the problem of outsourcing and globalizing the legal 
profession,62 assessing the impact of globalization on the political, 
economic, and social landscapes of the developed and undeveloped 
world,63 and evaluating how successfully American legal institutions have 
been exported abroad,64 among other topics. Richard Oppong has assessed 
the state of private international law in Africa;65 Chris Okeke has 
evaluated Africa’s mineral resources;66 and George Nnona has written 
about Nigerian investment and choice of law, among other topics.67 
Sompong Sucharitkul has focused on indigenous peoples and Asian 
nations in the Far East.68 A number of scholars are focusing on Islam, an 
especially important topic in the world today.69 And Bernhard Grossfeld 
and Josef Hoeltzenbein have taken a look at Australian aborigines.70 We 
might also consider approaches that focus on particular countries, legal 
systems, or regions of the world.71 These are just some of our portals to 
other lands. 
 
 
 62. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2189 (2007). 
 63. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Analyzing the Friedman Thesis Through a Legal Lens: Book 
Review Essay Assessing Thomas L. Friedman’s The World is Flat, 81 TUL. L. REV. 923 (2007). 
 64. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, From the ALI to the ILI: The Efforts to Export an American Legal 
Institution, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1255 (2005). 
 65. See Richard Frimpong Oppong, Private International Law in Africa: The Past, Present, and 
Future, 55 AM J. COMP. L. 677 (2007). 
 66. See Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, The Second Scramble for Africa’s Oil and Mineral Resources: 
Blessing or Curse?, 42 INT’L L. 193 (2008). 
 67. See George Nnona, The Nigerian Investment and Securities Act: Delineating Its Boundaries 
in Relation to the Registration of Securities, 50 J. AFR. L. 24 (2006); George Nnona, Choice of Law in 
International Contracts for the Transfer of Technology: A Critique of the Nigerian Approach, 44 J. 
AFR. L. 38 (2000). 
 68. See Sucharitkul, supra note 55; Sompong Sucharitkul, Thai Law and Buddhist Law, 46 AM. 
J. COMP. L. SUPP. 69 (1998); Sucharitkul, supra note 7; see also John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive 
Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 657 (2008). 
 69. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Cohen, Islamic Law in Iran: Can It Protect the International Legal 
Right of Freedom of Religion and Belief?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 247 (2008); Intisar A. Rabb, “We the 
Jurists”: Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 527 (2008); Ossama Siddique & 
Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan–Controversial Origins, 
Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 303 (2008). 
 70. See Bernhard Grossfeld & Josef Hoeltzenbein, Poetic Legal Dreams: Cross-Cultural 
Pioneers, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 47 (2007). 
 71. See Reimann, supra note 8. 
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Second, we must start employing the science of comparative law to 
help solve problems that transcend national borders. In our increasingly 
globalized world, we are all faced with common sets of problems to solve. 
We need to focus on big policy questions so that these questions can be 
evaluated from a different perspective. Comparative law has much to offer 
here. 
Consider some examples. First, let us examine antitrust law. In the 
United States, antitrust law has moved significantly toward the goal of 
protecting consumer economic interests. It aims to structure the market so 
as to maximize benefits to consumers, focusing on the lowest pricing 
possible.72 Bigness or market dominance by firms can help drive prices 
lower. In part, this reflects a deregulatory approach. By contrast, the 
European analog to antitrust law, competition law, is most concerned with 
protection of the interests of competitors in a given industry and with 
protection of consumer safety and well-being. For Europeans, bigness is a 
danger; it may mean that large competitors will drive smaller firms out of 
business and thereby be in a position to exploit consumers.73 Europeans 
are concerned that consumers will be misled.74 For Europeans, competition 
law is a question of protecting integral parts of the society: the economy 
and consumers.75 The European approach is much more proactive in 
 
 
 72. James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 
YALE L.J. 340, 371–72 (2007). 
 73. Id. at 373. An important example is Microsoft. In the United States Microsoft was able to 
settle its antitrust suit, which involved tying its web browser (Internet Explorer) to its operating system 
(Windows), under a consent decree in 2002. But the litigation in Europe went on for quite some time, 
with Microsoft finally having to settle. For an analysis of the Microsoft antitrust litigation, see Amanda 
Cohen, Surveying the Microsoft Antitrust Universe, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 333 (2004). At bottom, 
this, too, reflected a difference in approach to antitrust law. The Microsoft argument for “consumer 
economic welfare” simply will not work in Europe. Again, American law is pro-competition and 
oriented toward economic efficiency, whereas the European Union is also interested in being pro-
competitor, assuring the integrity of the market. Whitman, supra note 72, at 373–74. Economic 
efficiency, consumer welfare, and market integration are major goals of European antitrust law, too, 
but these can only follow from assurance of the integrity of the market being open to all players. See, 
e.g., Andreas Kirsch & William Weesner, Can Antitrust Law Control E-commerce? A Comparative 
Analysis in Light of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 297 (2006); Jason 
M. Sullivan, European Union Antitrust Enforcement: A Distinct Prosecution or a More Principled 
Approach?, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 457 (2005). European law 
seeks to protect consumers and small firms from the aggregation of power into the hands of a 
few firms, or even one large firm. The fears behind this motive are that consumers need to be 
protected not only from increased prices and lower quality that may result from less 
competition, but also from threats to political power and democracy that may result from 
large aggregations of economic power in the hands of the few. 
Id. at 471 (citations omitted). 
 74. Whitman, supra note 72, at 380. 
 75. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, The Political Economy of Merger Regulation, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 
(2005). Aditi Bagchi observes that the United States follows a consumerist model for antitrust, 
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enforcing antitrust law to accomplish these goals, intervening when 
necessary to protect the operation of the market, society, and local culture. 
Antitrust law raises important questions. What is more important: 
consumer economic interests or consumer welfare, including the safety 
and security of goods purchased and full and fair dissemination of 
information so that consumers will not be duped? How do we want the 
economy to operate? Do we want market dominance, which might initially 
lead to low prices but eventually facilitate market capture? Or, do we want 
a free and open playing field for all? Should fairness for consumers and 
market players and avoidance of market manipulation be the goal? 
Another important, related issue concerns consumer protection and the 
operation of markets. A look into United States versus European 
approaches offers important perspectives. The United States’ economy is 
consumer driven.76 The main focus of this model of consumer protection is 
economics; its aim is therefore that consumers will benefit from the low 
prices caused by a competitive market. The idea here is that the consumer 
is sovereign and with a wide availability of goods at different prices, the 
consumer will choose based on consideration of price or quality.77 The 
United States model is based, quite simply, on “consumer economic 
interests.”78 
By contrast, the European model (focusing mainly on Germany and 
France) is more concerned with consumer protection. While the American 
model is concerned with economics and competitive pricing, the 
Europeans tend to be more concerned with protection of the markets and 
protection of consumers. Protection of the markets follows what James 
 
 
employing the philosophy of law and economics in order to produce goods at the cheapest prices. Id. at 
2. The European Union rejects this philosophy, as the EU is more concerned about maintaining the 
integrity of the European economy, and avoiding market dominance by any one firm. Id. at 2–3. In the 
past, the American antitrust model employed the producerist model outlined by James Whitman as a 
way to protect integral elements of the economy. Whitman, supra note 72, at 345–46; Bagchi, supra 
note 75, at 3. In part, this reflected more of a state-by-state approach, as local governments wanted to 
protect their native industries. Bagchi, supra note 75, at 3. But with the increasing nationalization of 
the United States economy, control shifted toward the federal government, which now rules the 
antitrust field. Id. at 24. The resulting federal policy often employs the Chicago School approach of 
law and economics. Id. at 3. Bagchi concludes, like Whitman, that the United States’ economy is 
consumer-oriented, and that Europe’s is producerist or antidominance-oriented. Id. at 4–5; Kirsch & 
Weesner, supra note 73, at 308 (“A radical Efficiency Model has not been applied in the E.U., and 
generally E.U. antitrust law is more interventionist than U.S. antitrust law.”). 
 76. Whitman, supra note 72, at 399. 
 77. Id. at 346. For instance, “[m]any American firms use loss leaders in order to draw consumers 
into their establishments, in the hope they will buy more profitable goods. . . . For example, large 
appliance retailers such as Circuit City can sell appliances at or below cost, because they can make 
money by inducing consumers to buy warranties.” Id. at 377. 
 78. Id. at 399. 
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Whitman calls a “producerism” model, in which a “producer” is “any actor 
who provide[s] some factor in the production and distribution of goods 
and services.”79 The concern here is with assuring that the market for 
goods will survive, notwithstanding the onslaught of competition. The 
second objective is the protection of consumers. Here the concern is that 
consumers will not be duped into buying shoddy goods, which, of course, 
would usually be priced below market.80 
An analysis of these two models indicates different root assumptions. 
In the United States, emphasis is placed on money and freedom of choice 
for consumers. Each consumer bears the burden of gauging his or her own 
best interests. In Europe, the focus is on creating stable markets for the 
preservation of society and the security of citizens acting as consumers. 
Can Americans or Europeans learn from the other? Should the free market 
order our affairs, as in the United States? What does this mean? Does it 
mean money should rule? If money rules, then will the marketplace 
become a stage for the survival of the fittest, those who are most energetic, 
driven, greedy, or egomaniacal? Or is some form of state protection 
necessary to assure a free-flowing economy, as in Europe? Might some 
state paternalism (an idea despised by Americans) help secure a free 
market economy, while safeguarding citizens’ welfare? Would the 
European approach have helped prevent the United States housing 
collapse, caused in significant part by predatory mortgage practices?81 
Economically, would the European approach have ended up saving 
Americans far more money? And today, would some governmental 
regulatory infrastructure have helped prevent the current credit crisis and 
the resulting economic recession? Certainly here we can learn much from 
one another.82 
 
 
 79. Id. at 366. 
 80. As Whitman observes: 
[O]ver the last thirty years, American antitrust law has moved strongly in the direction of 
protecting the economic interests of consumers through fostering competition. According to 
standard American antitrust analysis, markets ought to be structured in such a way as to 
maximize benefits to consumers, and in particular to guarantee the kind of competition that 
yields the lowest possible prices. . . . Europe has long differed from the United States. As 
Americans see it, the European tradition has sought to protect competitors rather than 
consumers—as Americans would say, “We protect competition, you protect competitors.” 
Id. at 372–73 (citation omitted). 
 81. Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Beyond Subprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 12, 2008, at A1; Robert J. Shiller, How a Bubble Stayed Under the Radar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
2008, at BU6. 
 82. Sometimes a business plan based in one country does not translate to another country. A 
good example is Wal-Mart. The Wal-Mart model is based on loss leader pricing, offering goods at the 
lowest possible prices as a way of appealing to lower- and middle-class income groups. To do this, of 
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Data and personal privacy is another important topic that merits 
evaluation. Following the free market system, in the United States there is 
a free trade in personal information based on the idea that such trade is in 
consumers’ best interests, similar to the idea of consumer sovereignty 
discussed above. That is, “personal information is not treated as a right but 
as a commodity to be freely gathered, accessed, exchanged, and bought 
and sold on the idea that it is in consumers’ best interests as a matter of 
economic efficiency and satisfying consumer preference.”83 Thus, at 
bottom, the United States model reflects the free market idea. 
By contrast, German and European law is highly protective of privacy 
and personal information in a wide variety of contexts, like consumer data, 
credit reporting, and workplace privacy.84 Under German law, 
informational privacy is a fundamental right.85 It is becoming obvious that 
Europeans prize the human person, viewing the person as intrinsically 
valuable and thus placed in the position to control his or her fate, including 
personal information. 
 
 
course, Wal-Mart is notorious in paying very low wages and offering meager employment benefits. 
See, e.g., Adam Nagourney & Michael Barbaro, Eye on Election, Democrats Run As Wal-Mart Foe, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at A23. Now, how does the Wal-Mart plan transfer over to another 
country? Sometimes it works. But in Germany it failed. For one thing, the practice of using loss 
leaders or below-cost pricing is largely forbidden in Europe. Whitman, supra note 72, at 376–77. 
Why? Again, out of concern for protection of integral elements of the economy and protection of 
consumer interests. Id. at 377–79. 
 83. Edward J. Eberle, The German Idea of Freedom, 10 ORE. REV. INT’L L. 1, 71–72 (2008). 
 84. See id. at 71; James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1190–96 (2004) (mentioning authorities collected). “Europeans have 
aggressively condemned traffic in consumer data.” Id. at 1192. By comparison, “Americans are much 
more willing to tolerate industry self-regulation.” Id. at 1193. Among other things, Europeans protect 
employees’ privacy and criminals at the same level as celebrities. Id. at 1194–95. 
 The fight between the European Union and the United States over a European Council Directive, 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, resulted, ultimately, in a safe harbor compromise. Issuance of Safe 
Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000). 
These personal privacy issues are still highly contested. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, E-commerce and 
Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 717 (2001). 
 For a valuable evaluation of American privacy law, see JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: 
THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000). See also P. Amy Monahan, Deconstructing 
Information Walls: The Impact of the European Data Directive on U.S. Business, 29 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 275 (1998); Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and 
International Relations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 655 (2002). 
 85. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1983, 
65 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (Census Act Case); 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 16, 1969, 27 Entscheidungen 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (Microcensus Case). In the United States, information 
privacy has not, as yet, risen to the status of a fundamental right. The most pertinent case would be 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), in which the Supreme Court simply sketched the idea of 
informational data protection. There has been no further work on this topic by the Court. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
480 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:451 
 
 
 
 
So here, too, we have a fundamental difference: Europeans prize the 
person and the person should be able to control his or her life. By contrast, 
Americans prize a faith in the markets; the markets can determine what is 
appropriate use of personal information. Here, the comparative law 
approach can be quite valuable: looking at the different legal orders to 
force a re-evaluation of either or both the foreign and our legal system. 
Should the free market control the use of personal data? Or should there be 
some concern for personal welfare in this matter concerning private 
information? 
Many corporations operate multinationally. Consider some of the 
topics that could benefit from comparative observation: antitrust law (as 
discussed above), accounting standards, and corporate formation (local or 
supra national). Let us take a brief look at some of these topics. Let us start 
with accounting standards. In the United States, the conventional measure 
is Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). Under United 
States accounting standards, the main focus is on the shareholders of the 
company: “accounting is designed to show shareholders the company cash 
flow, a practice that necessarily emphasises short term profit 
performance.”86 In employing accounting practices, American accountants 
take a much more flexible and less cautious approach to appraising 
assets.87 Was the creatively flexible approach of American accountants a 
major cause of the accounting scandals that rocked the United States in the 
1990s, such as the Enron collapse or the demise of Arthur Anderson?88 
By contrast, European accounting standards have a different focus. In 
Europe, the American approach “is regarded as lax. Continental European 
accountants are trained to strictly follow statutory provisions.”89 
Europeans are much more conservative in their approach to accounting.90 
 
 
 86. Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Accounting, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 233, 241 (1993). 
 87. Id. at 244 (“Rigid rules do not prevent an accountant from applying his own judgments, nor 
do they stand in the way of presenting a ‘true and fair view.’ There is room for fantasy, or more 
precisely, for creative accounting—whatever that may be!”); see also S.J. Gray, Towards a Theory of 
Cultural Influence on the Development of Accounting Systems Internationally, 24 ABACUS 1, 10 
(1998) (observing “much less conservative attitudes of accountants in the U.S.A. and U.K.”). 
 88. A major problem with the Enron collapse was that accountants manipulated financial 
statements as a gimmick to show that they complied with the letter, if not the substance, of GAAP. 
Mark J. Hanson, Becoming One: The SEC Should Join the World in Adopting the International 
Financial Reporting Standards, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 521, 534 (2006). “Enron was 
able to materially overstate its earnings by not being required to consolidate the earnings results of its 
SPEs with its own results.” Id. at 534–35. In effect, Enron was “cooking the books.” Id. at 535. 
 89. Grossfeld, supra note 86, at 244. 
 90. Gray, supra note 87, at 10. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss3/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] THE METHOD AND ROLE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 481 
 
 
 
 
Instead of a focus on shareholders, the European focus is on creditors and 
banks.91 
For example, German companies often put away hidden reserves as a 
buffer against financial storms. The accounting difference in Germany and 
the United States can be huge: “Before Daimler-Benz merged with 
Chrysler it had reported net income of $346 million in its statement for 
1993. Under GAAP the company would have reported a $1 billion loss. 
Under German law Daimler-Benz could include as income $2.4 billion in 
reserves taken in prior years.”92 
As observed by Professor S.J. Gray, it is obvious that cultural factors 
play a leading role in countries’ different accounting standards.93 So would 
the more conservative European accounting approach have helped prevent 
the Enron collapse? Would a more conservative approach to accounting 
have provided needed stability to the economy? For these reasons, should 
Americans reassess their accounting standards? In part, Americans have 
actually already revised their accounting standards: the adoption of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) mandated stricter accounting 
standards and prohibited conflicts of interest stemming from accountants 
performing audits and consulting for the same company.94 As a result of 
SOX, many foreign companies have been dissuaded from listing on United 
States capital markets due to the rigorous standards and high cost.95 Is 
 
 
 91. Grossfeld, supra note 86, at 242. 
Germany and many other continental European countries see financial statements from a 
different angle. These statements do not seek primarily to impress investors. Instead, creditors 
take the first place. Therefore, companies evaluate all assets and liabilities prudently, that is, 
in case of doubt assign lower values for assets and higher values for liabilities. Why? In the 
19th century the banks served as the leading sponsors and promoters of the newly invented 
“corporations.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 92. Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Accounting: Where Internet Meets Geography, 48 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 261, 273 (2000). 
 93. Gray, supra note 87, at 7. As Gray observes, cultural and social values play a leading role in 
the differing approaches to accounting. For example, external influences might include forces of 
nature, trade, investment and conquest. Ecological influences can be geographic, economic, 
demographic, genetic, historical, technological, or related to urbanization. Id. at 7. For an important 
follow-up study to Gray’s article, see Shalin Chanchani & Alan MacGregor, A Synthesis of Cultural 
Studies in Accounting, 18 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 1 (1999) (noting, among other things, the 
anthropological approach to accounting). 
 For an important evaluation of issues with the liability of independent external auditors of 
corporate financial statements that considers the differing approaches of states within the United States 
and then contrasts them with European approaches, see Werner F. Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: 
Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governance and the Independent Auditor’s Responsibilities, 79 
NW. U. L. REV. 663 (1984). 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(e) (2006). 
 95. Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at Finance Dublin (Mar. 26, 2007), transcript 
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SOX now a barrier to foreign capital sources? Or does its stricter standards 
provide much needed safeguards against financial manipulation? Is GAAP 
still better? Does its flexibility allow the United States economy to adjust 
as needed to new economic changes? These are important questions to 
consider. 
And now with the rise of global capital markets spurred on by the 
emergence of the internet, national markets face many readjustments.96 
Here, too, accounting plays a major role. What accounting standards 
should apply? If the American Wall Street markets still control global 
capital markets, will GAAP still rule? Certainly that is the American 
preference, based on the idea that GAAP is still the gold standard in 
accounting and best protects investors. Or, by contrast, will the new 
accounting standard become the rules of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (“IFRS”), formerly known as International 
Accounting Standards (“IAS”)?97 The European Union favors IFRS, 
whereas the United States favors GAAP.98 There are major differences 
between the two standards. The IFRS is more “pluralistic,” allowing for a 
number of alternatives in evaluating assets:99  
GAAP prohibits recognition of deferred taxes; IAS requires it. 
GAAP requires recognition of certain types of equity compensation 
benefits; IAS does not. Under GAAP internally generated research 
and development costs must be treated as an expense when 
incurred; IAS demands that development costs be capitalized if they 
meet specific criteria.100 
However, today there is increasing movement toward harmonization of 
GAAP and IFRS. The Norwalk Agreement of 2002 produced a major 
effort to harmonize the two accounting standards.101 In short, with the rise 
 
 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/Speech/2007/spch032607psa.htm. 
 96. Grossfeld, supra note 92, at 266. 
 97. Id. at 275 (“The IASC is a private-sector organization that was created in 1973 by major 
professional accountancy bodies. Today it includes 133 professional accountancy bodies (representing 
103 countries).”). 
 98. Id. at 275. 
 99. Id. at 277 (“As a result corporations from different national accounting backgrounds all 
pretend that their financial statements have been prepared in conformity with IAS.”). 
 100. Id. at 280. 
 101. Hanson, supra note 88, at 546–47. The SEC is now “preparing a timetable that will permit 
American companies to shift to the international rules, which are set by a foreign organization and give 
companies greater latitude in reporting earnings.” Stephen Labaton, Accounting Plan Would Allow Use 
of Foreign Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2008, at A1. One problem, however, is that foreign enforcement 
authorities are generally less rigorous in enforcing standards than the SEC. Id.; see also Bernhard 
Grossfeld, Comparative Corporate Governance: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles v. 
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of a globally linked world, we have competing capital markets, which in 
turn will lead to competing rules and standards, as examined here with 
respect to accounting. Most likely, the capital markets will determine the 
outcome. So, what will happen? A convergence of global accounting 
standards, along the lines of IFRS? If so, will that lead to “outsourcing 
safety standards,” as Professor James Cox commented?102 Or will GAAP 
still control insofar as American capital markets still prevail? There is 
much to examine here from a comparative perspective. 
Another corporate issue involves the formation of a corporation. In the 
United States, corporate law is regulated by each of the fifty states. 
National corporations will often choose to incorporate in the state with the 
most lax laws, creating a so-called “race to the bottom,” with Delaware as 
the most prominent site for the incorporation of national companies. In 
Europe, the Member States of the European Union each have different 
rules. The United Kingdom is among the more lax, somewhat akin to the 
United States, and Germany is among the more strict, with its co-
determination laws that give workers a stake in running the company.103 
After a long struggle in the European Union, mainly over workers’ 
participation in management, a European corporate form is now in place, 
the Societas Europeae (“SE”), which allows business operations to take 
place throughout the European Union.104  
Should the United States follow this model? Or is state-by-state control 
better, reflecting the American tendency toward federalism? Would a 
national United States corporation make for more harmonization of rules, 
 
 
International Accounting Standards?, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 847 (2002); David S. Ruder et 
al., Creation of World Wide Accounting Standards: Convergence and Independence, 25 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 513 (2005). 
 102. Labaton, supra note 101. 
 103. In Germany, for example, business organizations with more than five hundred employees 
must have a supervisory board that supervises the operation of the company, consisting of two-thirds 
shareholders and one-third employee representatives. If the company has more than two thousand 
employees, the supervisory board must consist of fifty percent shareholders and fifty percent 
employees” representatives. Herbert Wiedemann, Codetermination by Workers in German 
Enterprises, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 79, 79–80 (1980). 
 104. For evaluation of the controversy surrounding SE in the phase leading up to its adoption, see 
Werner F. Ebke, Company Law and the European Union: Centralized Versus Decentralized 
Lawmaking, 31 INT’L LAW. 961 (1997). The SE was finally approved by the EU in 2004. “The SE 
must be established as a public-limited liability company and have a minimum legal capital of 120,000 
euros.” Marco Ventoruzzo, “Cost-Based” and “Rules-Based” Regulatory Competition: Markets for 
Corporate Charters in the U.S. and in the E.U., 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 91, 144 (2006). Thus, the SE is 
mainly an option for large companies on account of the costs and cumbersome procedure of formation. 
Benjamin Angelette, The Revolution That Never Came and the Revolution Coming–De Lasteyrie Du 
Salliant, Marks & Spencer, Sevic Systems and the Changing Corporate Law in Europe, 92 VA. L. REV. 
1189, 1210 (2006). See id. for an evaluation of the increasing mobility of incorporators to form and 
move corporations around the EU. 
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lower transactions costs, more mobility, and a more efficient operation? 
By contrast, does the American state-by-state approach still have broad 
appeal because it addresses the concern for limitation of government? 
Which do Americans favor: big corporations or big government? Or, 
should the countries of Canada, Mexico, and the United States consider 
adopting a NAFTA corporation, modeled on the SE? Would this offer the 
same benefits as the SE? Evaluation of this public policy question could be 
quite valuable, especially given the increasing changes in national and 
global economies. 
A final important public policy to consider is criminal law. In the 
United States, the focus is on retribution for crimes committed. 
Accordingly, the United States is the only Western country, and one of the 
few countries in the world, that still applies the death penalty. For 
noncapital but serious offenses, the penalty is life or long-term 
imprisonment. Incarceration rates are higher in the United States than in 
any Western country, more on par with countries like China and Russia.105 
A person can be jailed even for minor violations, such as “smoking 
cigarettes in the New York subway” or “driving without a seatbelt,” the 
criminality of which the Supreme Court has upheld.106 In the United 
States, the policy of retribution might reflect strong Christian values based 
on Old Testament retribution; underlying issues of racism, yet pervasive in 
American society; or the prevalence of violence.107 
By contrast, the European focus is on rehabilitation, not retribution. 
There is no death penalty in Europe; life imprisonment is used sparingly, 
only in the case of extremely heinous crimes,108 and the focus is instead on 
rehabilitation so that convicted criminals can reenter society and resume a 
 
 
 105. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE 
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 4 (2003). One major influence on the increased incarceration rate is 
the “three-strikes-and-you’re-out” policy, a baseball metaphor itself reflecting American culture. Id. at 
56. 
 106. Id. at 3. 
 107. Id. at 6. 
 108. In Germany, for example, life imprisonment may be imposed as a penalty only in the event 
of an especially heinous crime, such as a horrible murder, that also presents a need to protect the 
public. For example, in November 2006 a court found life imprisonment appropriate for Stephan 
Letter, “a nurse described as Germany’s worst serial killer since World War II, [who] was convicted of 
killing 28 patients at a hospital in southern Sonthofen in 2003 and 2004 . . . injecting them with a 
mixture of drugs.” Germany: Nurse Guilty of Killing 28 Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A14. 
Even then, a sentence of life imprisonment is reviewed every fifteen years to determine if the life 
sentence should remain in effect or, instead, if the felon should be released from prison. Emails from 
Professor Winfried Brugger to author (Nov. 28, 2006 & Oct. 29, 2008) (on file with author). In other 
words, the right to preserve existing human life takes precedence over the rehabilitation of the 
murderer. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 21, 1977, 45 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 187 (Life Imprisonment Case). 
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normal life. For example, in the famous German case of Lebach,109 the 
German Constitutional Court determined that a felon’s personal rights to a 
healthy re-entry into society, after serving his prison term, outweighed the 
showing of an accurate documentary depicting his and others’ roles in a 
notorious crime. That is, personal rights trumped expressive rights. The 
value of the person was more important than the broadcast. Thus, the 
European policy likely reflects concern with human dignity, nurturing of 
people and mercy as a virtue, a Christian New Testament value.110 The 
idea of rooting the legal order in human dignity is based, significantly, of 
course, in a reaction to the Nazi era. So here, should a careful look at 
alternative approaches to theories of criminal punishment add dimensions 
and insights into the proper basis for criminal law?111 Should the United 
States, as a Western country, better reflect Western culture? What about 
the economic costs of the burgeoning prison population? Could money be 
better saved by trying to rehabilitate criminals and reintroduce them to 
society as productive citizens? Would this effort help both save money and 
spur the economy? Would it also better reflect the Christian values of 
treating people as valuable and equal or the philosophic norm of treating 
people with dignity? Would a focus on rehabilitation help give criminals a 
second chance so that they might be able to live as normal human beings 
in daily life? Or is it better for the United States to follow more severe 
models of penal law, as in China, Russia, or Iran? Are the economic costs 
worth keeping criminals off the street in order to safeguard the public? 
This short examination of topics of significant public policy 
importance reveals that comparative law has much to offer as a window 
into alternative solutions for pressing policy issues. It can be quite useful 
to look outside our borders to see if other perspectives can usefully shed 
light on core policy questions. Illuminating alternative views on important 
policy issues can, in turn, force a healthy reassessment of and dialogue on 
these issues. We need comparative law to take on these broader missions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that comparative law is in need of an overhaul if it is to take 
its rightful place as an important legal science, along the lines of the new 
movements that have developed over the last thirty years, such as law and 
 
 
 109. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 5, 1973, 35 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 202. 
 110. WHITMAN, supra note 105, at 13; see also Savelsberg, supra note 23. 
 111. See, e.g., WHITMAN, supra note 105. 
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economics and Critical Legal Studies. First, we need to focus on 
developing and applying a sound methodology, as employed in law and 
economics. I have set forth a four-step process. Step 1 consists of 
acquiring the skills of a comparativist. Step 2 involves applying 
comparative skill to evaluate the external law. Step 3 similarly calls for the 
application of comparative skills to evaluate the internal law. Finally, Step 
4 entails assembling the observations resulting from the comparative 
investigation. Perhaps others will find alternative, better comparative law 
methodologies. We certainly need to assess and reassess the proper 
approach. 
Additionally, comparative law must take on broader missions. We need 
to explore more deeply non-Western and nontraditional cultures. We need 
to step outside of our own native predispositions to see if we can learn 
more from those influenced by different cultural patterns. Looking outside 
the west might have a major influence on personal behavior, communal 
ties and support, stewardship of the earth’s resources, and trading 
practices, among other subjects. And comparative law needs to be 
employed to help shed insight on major public policy issues. I have 
mentioned just a few: antitrust, consumerism, data privacy, accounting, 
formation of corporations, and criminal law. There are many more to 
consider. 
Comparative law should now be set up to serve a new and important 
role in the twenty-first century. Through comparative law we can embark 
on a new course as we try to figure out what to do in our modern, 
increasingly globalized world. Comparative law has a large role to play 
here. We need to take on these new tasks as a way to improve human 
welfare and our legal order, whether national, regional, or international. 
Understanding law and culture is key to understanding people, and in the 
end, understanding people is what we need to do. 
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